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Abstract
Why has the recent covid-19 pandemic led to the imposition of export quotas in many
countries? Why is the agricultural sector highly protected in developed economies? We
show how the addition of subsistence constraints to the standard models of international
trade together with a potential shock to trade offers a simple explanation of these facts.
This simple adaption of the standard trade model also provides a new mechanism for the
existence of a ’Transfer Paradox’. A transfer of resources prior to production acts as a
kind of ex ante insurance against trade disruption which mitigates the effects of the missing
market for trade disruption insurance. The effect of a transfer can be large enough that
both the donor and recipient benefit. Although the analysis focuses on agricultural goods
it applies to any good or technology regarded as essential for production.
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1 Introduction
Why has the covid-19 pandemic caused many countries to quickly impose export restrictions
on agricultural goods?1 Why have negotiations over agricultural subsidies in the Doha Devel-
opment Round at the World Trade Organisation been so protracted?2 Why is the agricultural
sector a highly protected sector in the first place? This paper shows how these facts can be
easily explained by the addition of subsistence constraints to standard models of international
trade together with a potential shock to trade. The model shows that countries will not wish
to expand trade to a level where they are vulnerable in the event of trade disruption and that
an increase in the probability of trade disruption will reduce the optimal level of trade. This
adapted model also shows the large potential benefits of international cooperation and provides
a new mechanism by which a ‘Transfer Paradox’ may occur. Economies will not want trade
to the extent that it leaves them with less than subsistence if trade is disrupted. Economies
close to subsistence will therefore not specialize very much regardless of the international price.
Transfers that take an economy away from subsistence will give it scope to benefit from trade.
This increase in trade may benefit the whole world economy including the transferring economy.
This logic is not only applicable to the agricultural sector. The analysis suggests that economies
will not wish to completely specialize away from the production of goods and technologies that
are essential to production.3
Although extremely straightforward this simple amendment to the standard trade model
has profound implications. There is currently no shortage of food at the global level, but
as Sen (1982) pointed out, famines aren’t created by the lack of available food.4 It is the
distribution of food that is crucial. This analysis shows that free international trade can permit
the global economy to create large surpluses above subsistence but only if the distribution of
these surpluses is such that all countries are guaranteed not to suffer.
This paper may be seen as a blend of several important strands in the international trade
and development literature, notably the literatures on the evolution of economies away from
subsistence to a state of sustained ecnomic growth, on international trade under uncertainty
with incomplete markets, on international trade and non-homothetic preferences, and on inter-
national trade and conflict. Galor and Weil (2000) have shown how subsistence constraints can
limit investment in fertility and human capital accumulation at low levels of development and
how this can lead economies to spend long periods close to subsistence levels of income. Galor
and Mountford (2009) showed, in this context, how international trade can magnify differences
in development and have large effects on the world distribution of income and population. The
1Laborde, David, Abdullah Mamun, and Marie Parent.(2020) document the following countries imposing food
export restrictions : Russia,Viet Nam, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, Serbia, Cambodia, Honduras,
Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Turkey,South Africa, Romania, North Macedonia, Ghana, and Algeria.
2See e.g. Hanrahan and Schnept (2007) and WTO (2017) for descriptions of the intricacies of agricultural
subsidy negotiations at the WTO and how issues such as food security and recovering from natural disasters are
accepted as legitimate policy objectives
3Increased complexity of production processes in developed economies, see e.g. Kremer (1993) implies that
economic development won’t necessarily cause these concerns to disappear.
4Although there may be a shortage of covid-19 vaccine if one is created.
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literature on the effects of uncertainty and international trade under complete and incomplete
markets is very large.5 This paper is related to the incomplete markets literature that has
shown how the standard theorems of international trade, such as the benefits and pareto opti-
mality of free trade, need not hold in this environment, see for example Newbury and Stiglitz
(1984) and Cheng (1987). However this literature has not examined the implications of subsis-
tence constraints for the relationship between trade and growth and therefore the implications
of transfer payments and world income inequality for the potential gains from trade. The paper
is also closely related to the literature on trade and conflict notably Martin, Mayer and Thoenig
(2008) and Rohner,Thoenig and Zilibotti (2013). They show international trade interacts with
the prospect of conflict and finds intuitively, and consistently with this paper, that countries
with more multilateral trade links are associated with a greater propensity for conflict as this
implies a reduced effect of ceasing international trade with any one other country. This paper
deals with the different context of pandemics which are quasi exogenous events and which have
the potential to reduce trade globally.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we set up the simple model of international
trade with subsistence constraints and the possibility of trade disruption. The following section
then examines the gains from trade in a two country world economy and demonstrates how a
transfer from an economy far away from subsistence to one close to the subsistence constraint
can lead to benefits for both economies.
2 International Trade with a Subsistence Constraint and the
Possibility of Trade Disruption
We first consider a standard two good Ricardian model of trade with constant returns to scale,
with a subsistence constraint and the possibility of trade disruption. We derive the optimal
levels of production and consumption for a small economy and show that trade is decreasing
in the possibility of trade disruption. We then extend the model to decreasing returns to scale
production functions.
Consider the standard Ricardian model of a small open economy with two goods, x and
y, which are produced with one factor of production, labor, L. The economy is endowed with a
L¯ units of labor and a given set of linear constant-returns production technologies for each of







where Li is the amount of labor used in the production of good i, and ai is the amount of labor
required in order to produce one unit of good i for i = x, y. Full employment of resources






















Figure 1: The impact of subsistence constraints on the level of trade
A social planner maximizes the utility of a representative agent who is subject to a
subsistence constraint for the consumption of goods x and y that agents need to consume
at least (x˜, y˜) to survive. To represent this case we use a Stone Geary utility function u =
α log(Xc − x˜) + (1 − α) log(Y c − y˜), where Xc and Y c are the amount of good x and good
y consumed respectively. Given, p∗, the international relative price of x the planner chooses
Xp, Y p, Xc and Y c to maximize utility. We will consider the case where p∗ < ax/ay, the other
cases follow directly.
When there is no possibility of trade disruption, the agent’s maximization problem is
Max{Xp,Y p,Xc,Y c} α log(Xc − x˜) + (1− α) log(Y c − y˜) + λ(Y p + p∗Xp − Y c − p∗Xc)
which implies the optimal demand functions; Xc = x˜+ α(I /p∗ − x˜− y˜/p∗) and Y c = y˜ + (1−
α)(I − p∗x˜− y˜). Income is maximized where Xp = 0 and Y p = L¯/ay, since p∗ < ax/ay.
If, however, agents perceive there to be a chance, π, that trade does not take place after
production decisions are taken then the planner’s maximization problem becomes
Max{Xp,Y p,Xc,Y c} πα log(X
p − x˜) + π(1− α) log(Y p − y˜) + (1− π)α log(Xc − x˜) +
(1− π)(1 − α) log(Y c − y˜) + λ(Y p + p∗Xp − Y c − p∗Xc)
The first order condition for this problem is
0 = πα
1







− π(1− α) 1




(1− π)(1 − α) 1





which implies Xp > x˜ in equilibrium. It also follows from total differentation that Xp will be




This economy is described in Figure 1 which shows how the limitation that Xp > x˜ limits













Figure 2: The impact of subsistence constraints on the level of trade with Decreasing Returns
to Scale
2.1 Decreasing Return to Scale Production Function
The same logic continues to hold with decreasing returns to scale production functions. Suppose
the amount of good x and y produced, Xp and Y p, are now given by the following production
functions,
Xp = ax(Lx)β; Y p = ay(Ly)γ
where as before Ly = L¯ − Lx and where β and γ are parameters such that 0 < β, γ < 1. The
planner’s maximization problem becomes,
Max{Xp,Y p,Xc,Y c} : πα log(ax(Lx)β − x˜) + π(1− α) log(ay(Ly)γ − y˜) + (1− π)α log(Xc − x˜)
+(1− π)(1− α) log(Y c − y˜) + λ(ay(Ly)γ + p∗ax(Lx)β − Y c − p∗Xc)
If we assume as above that in the absence of a subsistence constraint the optimal point of
production, Xp∗, is less than subsistence, Xp∗ < x˜ , then It = Y p + p∗Xp, will be decreasing
in Xp and so as before the first order conditions implies Xp > x˜ in equilibrium.6 This case
is depicted in Figure 2. This Figure depicts the case where the impact of the subsistence
constraints is small. However clearly the greater the proportion of potential production is the
subsistence constraint, the greater its impact on trade will be. When the proportion is close
to one the economy will be very close to its autarkic equilibrium position under free trade
regardless of the terms of trade. This case is depicted in Figure 3a below.
2.2 Parametric Examples
Parametric examples of the cases depicted in Figures 1 and 2 are as follows:
For the constant returns to scale economy L¯ = 40, ax = 4, ay = 1 p∗ = 1,α = 1
2
, x˜ = 4, and
y˜ = 4. The autarkic equilibrium has Xc = Xp = 6.5 and Y c = Y p = 14. Under international
6We are only considering economies where subsistence levels of both goods can be produced in autarky, which
is evolutionarily intuitive .
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trade with no prospect of trade disruption, (i.e. π = 0), then Xc = Y c = 20 and Xp = 0 and
Y p = 40. However if π = 1
10
then Xc ≈ Y c ≈ 13.5 and Xp ≈ 4.3 and Y p ≈ 22.7.
For the decreasing returns to scale economy we keep the scale of the axis by choosing
L¯ = 40, γ = 1
2
, β = 1
2




40 p∗ = 1,α = 1
2
, x˜ = 4, and y˜ = 4 . In this case
the autarkic equilibrium has Xc = Xp = 7.9 and Y c = Y p = 24.4 and the trade equilibrium
with p∗ = 1 and no prospect of trade disruption, has Xc = Y c ≈ 20.61 and Xp ≈ 2.43 and
Y p ≈ 38.81. However if π = 1
10
then Xc ≈ Y c ≈ 19.72 and Xp ≈ 5.13 and Y p ≈ 34.31.
3 Resource Transfers and the Gains from Trade in a Two Coun-
try Two Period Model of the World Economy
In this section we demonstrate the implications of the model described above for the role
of the world income distribution in the gains from trade. We do this via an example of a
mutually beneficial transfer, a ‘Transfer Paradox’, from an economy far away from its subsistence
constraint to one that is close to its subsistence constraint. In order to model the effects of
a transfer which occurs before production decisions are made one needs a model with at least
two periods. Production can then take place in the first period and resources be transferred
after the first period’s production and before the second period’s production decisions are made.
This implies that the goods transferred must also be storable. Thus the two period problem
must allow the agent to transfer resources from one period to the other. This complicates the
decision problem. We abstract away from the growth process by assuming that in autarky the
two periods are identical so that it is not optimal to transfer resources between periods.7
3.1 Autarky
Suppose that agents live for two periods, where L¯, ax, and ay are time invariant. Lifetime
utility, U,. is the sum of the expected utilities in the two periods, Ui, i = 1, 2 Thus in autarky
U = U1 + U2
U1 = α log(X
c
1 − x˜− sx) + (1− α) log(Y c1 − y˜ − sy)
U2 = α log(X
c
2 − x˜+ sx) + (1− α) log(Y c2 − y˜ + sy)
where the variables are defined as before with the subscript i = 1, 2 denoting the time period.
and where si is the transfer of good i from period 1 to period 2. Note that si must be non-




will be allocated optimally so that
the marginal utility of consumption in the two periods is identical.
7One could think of this as a reduced form of a steady state from a Galor and Weil (2000) style growth model.
A fuller description of the dynamics of the Galor Weil (2000) model would entail analyzing the interaction of
trade and transfers with technological progress and human capital accumulation and fertility. While these are
clearly fundamentally important issues they are distinct from the effect of income inequality, transfers and trade
risk explored in this paper.
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3.2 International Trade
If agents can trade at international price p∗ then their lifetime expected utility, EU , is the sum
of the expected utilities in the two periods, EUi, i = 1, 2, which now has to account for the
possibility of trade distruption in either or both of the two periods. Thus lifetime expected
utility is given by
EU = EU1 + EU2
EU1 = πα log(X
p
1
− x˜− sxπ) + π(1− α) log(Y p1 − y˜ − syπ)
+(1− π)α log(Xc1 − x˜− sx1−π) + (1− π)(1− α) log(Y c1 − y˜ − sy1−π)
EU2 = π[πα log(X
p
2
− x˜+ sxπ) + π(1− α) log(Y p2 − y˜ + syπ)
+(1− π)α log(Xc2 − x˜+ sxπ) + (1− π)(1 − α) log(Y c2 − y˜ + syπ)]
+(1− π)[πα log (Xp
2
− x˜+ sx1−π + π(1− α) log(Y p2 − y˜ + sy1−π)
+(1− π)α log(Xc2 − x˜+ sx1−π) + (1− π)(1− α) log(Y c2 − y˜ + sy1−π)]
where the variables are defined as before with the subscript i = 1, 2 denoting the time period.
and where siπ is the transfer of good i from period 1 to period 2 when there is no trade in period
1 and si
1−π is the transfer of good i from period 1 to period 2 when there is trade in period 1 for
i = x, y. As before siπ and s
i
1−π must be non-negative. Under international trade there may be
positive transfers as it may be utility enhancing to mitigate the possibility of trade disruption
in periuod 2 by saving resources in period 1 and transfering them to period 2 in order to allow
a greater level of trade. However as the level of income approaches the subsistence level these
transfers must also tend to zero.
3.2.1 Example of a Transfer Paradox
To demonstrate existence an example is sufficient. Consider a two country would economy with
two countries A and B . Suppose country A is very close to subsistence and so the optimal
trade policy is very close to autarky Consequently under free trade country B will be close to
its autarkic equilibrium. However if country B transfers enough resources at the end of period
1 to country A so that the subsistence constraint is less binding then both country A and B
may benefit from the increased trade.
Assume that in each country L¯ = 40, γ = 1
2
, β = 1
2
, α = 1
2
, π = 1
10
, x˜ = 4, and y˜ = 4 . We
assume that country A has ay,A =
√





where ai,j is productivity parameter for sector i in country j where i = x, y and j = A,B.
Thus country A has a comparative advantage in producing Y and country B has a comparative
advantage in producing X. Under free trade because of the subsistence constraint both countries
will operating very close to their autarkic position. In country A,Xc,A = Y c,A = Xp,A = Y p,A ≈
4. and in country B as in the example above Y c,B = Y p,B = 7.9 and Xc,B = Xp,B = 24.4. This
case is depicted in Figure 3























(b) The economy far away from subsistence
Figure 3: The transfer to the near subsistence economy move the equilibrium to the international
trade lines in the second period leading to increased utility in both economies.
A. Country A’s maximization problem in period 2 now becomes
Max{Lx} = [πα log (X
p
2
−x˜+ T ) + π(1− α) log (Y p
2
−y˜)
+(1− π)α log (Xc
2
−x˜+ T ) + (1− π)(1− α) log (Y c
2
−y˜)]
The transfer clearly mitigates the subsistence constraint and so alters country A’s production
decisions. If we set T = 4 then in this example country A will choose to specialize more in the
production of Y and in equilibrium Xp,A ≈ 1.10 and Y p,A ≈ 38.5 and country B to specialize
more in the production of X and in equailibrium Xp,B ≈ 34.45 and Y p,A ≈ 5.08. This allows
consumption of Xc,A ≈ 19.85 and Y p,A ≈ 21.87 and Xc,B ≈ 19.7 and Y c,A ≈ 21.71 with the
equilibrium price p∗ ≈ 1.1275.
Expected Utility in both countries has increased as a result of the transfer. Country A
is unaffected in period 1 and benefits in period 2, but for country B the loss in period 1 from
the transfer has to be weighed against the gains in period. The expected utility in country B
without the transfer is
2× [α log (24.4 − 4) + (1− α) log (7.9− 4)]= 4.16
and the expected utility in country B with the transfer is
α log (24.4 − T − 4) + (1− α) log (7.9− 4)+
π[α log (34.45 − 4) + (1− α) log (5.08 − 4)] + (1− π)[α log (19.7 − 4) + (1− α) log (21.71 − 4)]
= 4.79
and so utility in both countries has increased
Note that we have not derived the optimal level of transfer and assumed that the decision
to make the transfer was made after the first period. Both the ability to adjust production in
period 1 and the optimal choice of transfer will allow for an even greater gain from trade for
country B and so reinforces the point.
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3.2.2 A Simple Example with Leontief Preferences and Constant Returns to Scale
The previous example was calculated numerically. In this section we provide a closed form
solution using the constant returns to scale model with Leontief Preferences. Suppose now
that agents live for two periods and so maximize the following two period Leontief Preferences
utility function
u = { Min(E[(X
c
1




− x˜), (Y c
2
− y˜)]) for Xci ≥ x˜ and Y ci ≥ y˜ i=1,2
-∞ if Xci < x˜ or if Y ci < y˜ i=1,2
which implies that utility is maximized by maximizing total income over the two periods subject
to the subsistence constraint in each period and then dividing income so that Xc = Y c.
Consider the case where x˜ = y˜ = 4 and in country A LA = 40, ay,A = 1 and ax,A = 9.
Then in autarky country A would have Xc = Y c = Xp = Y p = 4 in both periods Suppose
there was another country B that had LB = 40, ay,B = 4 and ax,B = 1. Then in autarky
country B would have Xc = Y c = Xp = Y p = 8 in both periods. As above in this case the
free trade equilibrium is identical. However in a two period model, if country B consumed
only Xc = Y c = 4 in period 1 and transferred 4X to country A then in the following period
country A could produce Y p = 40 and trade with country B who would produce Xp = 40. At
international price p∗ = 1 country A would trade 18Y for 18X to consume 22 of both goods,
and country 2 would also have 22Y and 22X to consume. Thus the transfer of goods from B
to A will have increased global trade and production in both countries. The expected utility of
country A has clearly improved. If trade is disrupted the transfer makes their utility identical to
autarky, but if it isn’t disrupted then utility has increased to 18. Country B will lose out in case
of trade disruption and will have utility of 0, but will gain if trade is not disrupted obtaining
utility of 18 which is more than its autarkic utility of 8. Thus so long as the probability of trade
disruption, is not too high , π < 5
9
country B will also have benefitted from the transfer.
4 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated the large potential benefits of international cooperation and pro-
vided a new mechanism by which a ‘Transfer Paradox’ may occur by adding a subsistence
constraint to standard models of international trade together with a potential shock to trade.
Economies will not want trade to the extent that it leaves them with less than subsistence if
trade is disrupted. Transfers that take an economy away from subsistence will give it scope
to benefit from trade and this may benefit the whole world economy including the transferring
economy. This logic is not only applicable to the agricultural sector. The analysis suggests that
economies will not wish to completely specialize away from the production of any good and
technology vital to the production process.
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